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Tort law reform has resulted in legislation being passed by all Australian jurisdictions in the 
past decade implementing the recommendations contained in the Ipp Report. The report was 
in response to a perceived crisis in medical indemnity insurance. The objective was to restrict 
and limit liability in negligence actions. This paper will consider to what extent the reforms 
have impacted on the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions. The 
reversal of the onus of proof through the obvious risk sections has attempted to extend the 
scope of the defence of voluntary assumption of risk.  There is no liability for the 
materialisation of an inherent risk. Presumptions and mandatory reductions for contributory 
negligence have attempted to reduce the liability of defendants. It is now possible for 
reductions of 100% for contributory negligence. Apologies can be made with no admission of 
legal liability to encourage them being made and thereby reduce the number of actions being 
commenced. The peer acceptance defence has been introduced and enacted by legislation. 
There is protection for good samaritans even though the Ipp Report recommended against 
such protection. Limitation periods have been amended. Provisions relating to mental harm 
have been introduced re-instating the requirement of normal fortitude and direct perception. 
After an analysis of the legislation, it will be argued in this paper that while there has been 
some limitation and restriction, courts have generally interpreted the civil liability reforms in 
compliance with the common law. It has been the impact of statutory limits on the assessment 




On the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the insurance crisis and the period of torts law 
reform, it is appropriate to take this opportunity to consider to what extent the civil liability 
legislation in the various jurisdictions have limited the liability of health professionals in 
Australia.  Prior to the last decade, legislation was usually used to extend liability, not to limit 
it.1 Tort law reform has now resulted in legislation being passed by all Australian 
jurisdictions in the past decade implementing some of the recommendations contained in the 
Ipp Report2 as well as other reforms that were not included in the recommendations. The 
review of the law of negligence was in response to a perceived crisis in medical indemnity 
insurance.3 This included the collapse of HIH, the destruction of the World Trade Centre, the 
provisional liquidation of Australia’s largest medical defence organisation, United Medical 
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Protection, and the subsequent substantial increases in medical indemnity insurance. The 
objective of the review was to restrict and limit liability in negligence actions.4 
This paper will consider and reflect upon the extent to which the reforms have impacted on or 
reduced the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions. It is not within the 
scope of this paper to consider the elements of the negligence action: duty of care, breach and 
damage. Rather, this paper will consider the areas of defences and assessment of damages: 
contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk, good Samaritans, the peer acceptance 
defence, apologies, statutory limits on damages, limitation of actions and mental harm. 
It will be argued in this paper that the courts have generally interpreted the civil liability 
reforms in compliance with the common law. However the liability of health professionals 
has been limited by the civil liability legislation through the use of thresholds, caps and 
presumptions in the assessment of damages and apportioning liability between the parties 
rather than by the application of defences. Therefore this paper will consider defences and 
then statutory limits. 
 
Defences 
There are a number of possible defences to a negligence action including contributory 
negligence and voluntary assumption of the risk. There are also specific defences in medical 
negligence like the peer acceptance defence. Other maters included in this section include 
good samaritans and apologies. 
 
Contributory Negligence 
A common defence to an action in negligence is contributory negligence. Contributory 
negligence used to be a complete defence,5 however, since the apportionment legislation, 
liability can be apportioned and damages reduced.6  The Ipp Report recognised that at 
common law there was an application of a lower standard of care and recommended that it 
had to be emphasised that contributory negligence has to be measured against an objective 
standard, and the standard is the same as in establishing negligence against the defendant. 
The civil liability legislation in the various jurisdictions have introduced a number of sections 
to further this aim. Presumptions and mandatory reductions for contributory negligence have 
attempted to reduce the liability of defendants. It is now possible for reductions of 100% for 
contributory negligence. Also the standard of care for contributory negligence is the same as 
for negligence.  
There is an argument about whether the duty of the defendant and the duty of the plaintiff 
should be the same or different standard. The concept at common law has been that they are 
different because the failure by the defendant puts others at risk whereas the failure by the 
plaintiff only impacts on them. However the civil liability legislation states that they are the 
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same. This idea has also found support from Callinan and Heydon JJ in Vairy where it was 
stated that the plaintiff’s contributory negligence involves a breach of one’s duty to society 
not to become a burden on it by exposing oneself to risk.7 This statement was supported by 
Ipp JA in CBH v Edwards where the equivalence between the civil liability legislation and 
Callinan and Heydon JJ in Vairy8 was noted and the Court therefore did not accept that the 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence was less serious than the defendant’s breach of duty of 
care.9 
The “duty” to take reasonable care for his own safety that a plaintiff 
has is not simply a nakedly self-interested one, but one of enlightened 
self-interest which should not disregard the burden, by way of social 
security and other obligations that a civilised and democratic society 
will assume towards him if he is injured. In short, the duty that he 
owes is not just to look out for himself, but not to act in a way which 
may put him at risk, in the knowledge that society may come under 
obligations of various kinds to him if the risk is realised.10 
Prior to the recent civil liability reforms, the apportionment legislation in the various 
jurisdictions did not permit a court to find a plaintiff was 100 per cent contributory 
negligent.11 However, the situation is now different under the civil liability legislation12 
where 100 per cent apportionment is possible. In Adams by her next friend O’Grady v State 
of New South Wales,13 it was held that ‘the Court is entitled to come to a view that the 
contributory negligence should be assessed at 100 per cent of the cause of the injury’.14 But 
this has not happened in medical negligence cases and considering the expert knowledge 
involved, it is difficult to imagine such a case. 
All jurisdictions, except for the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, have 
sections in their civil liability legislation dealing with contributory negligence,15 which have 
been held to be reflective of the common law.16 The standard of care is the same as for 
negligence.17 The standard is different when the plaintiff is a child.18 Once contributory 
negligence is proven, the appropriate apportionment needs to be considered to determine 
what is ‘just and equitable’ in accordance with the legislation. This is subjective and based on 
findings of fact: 
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No doubt the making of the apportionment which the legislation requires 
involves a comparison of culpability of both parties ie, the degree to which each 
has departed from what is reasonable, but that is not the only element to be 
considered. Regards must be had to the relative importance of the acts of the 
parties in causing damage and it is the whole conduct of each negligent party in 
relation to the circumstances of the accident which must be subject to 
comparative examination.19 
There are mandatory reductions for intoxication20 but it would seem unlikely intoxication 
would be relevant in medical negligence cases. 
Since the High Court decision in Rogers v Whitaker21 courts have been prepared to focus on 
the conduct of the patient.22 However cases involving successful claims of contributory 
negligence are rare.23 There are some scenarios when contributory negligence can arise and 
be raised in medical negligence cases. One is when the patient does not return to see the 
doctor when requested or the patient does not adequately inform the doctor of the nature of 
the symptoms. In such a situation, the damages can be reduced by 20 per cent.24 There is a 
theme in the cases of an idea of ‘shared responsibility’25 between the health professional and 
the patient and that there are rights and responsibilities as a ‘consumer of medical services.’26 
Other scenarios include the patient failing to keep appointments with the doctor (in one case, 
liability was reduced by 50 per cent),27 and the patient failing to advise the staff at a fertility 
clinic that only one, not two, of the number of embryos should be transferred (where the 
liability was reduced by 35 per cent).28 There are many examples where allegations of 
contributory negligence have not been successful in medical negligence cases.29 
There were few examples in medical negligence cases where contributory negligence was 
successful before the civil liability reforms30 and there are still few successful cases since the 
introduction of the reforms.31  So it can be argued that introducing the same standard for both 
the plaintiff and the defendant in the civil liability legislation has not resulted in an increase 
in the success of the defence of contributory negligence.  
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 Voluntary Assumption of Risk 
Volenti non fit injuria (‘no injury is done to one who voluntarily consents’) is a complete 
defence to an action in negligence.32 If a plaintiff, with full knowledge, voluntarily accepts 
the risk of injury, he or she will not recover any damages. The defendant needs to prove not 
only that the plaintiff accepted the risk of injury but also accepted that if injury should 
happen, the plaintiff would accept the legal risk.33 Voluntary assumption of risk has 
traditionally been a difficult defence to prove especially since the introduction of the 
apportionment legislation. However, the Queensland Court of Appeal recently upheld a plea 
of the defence, stating that ‘while the defence of volenti may be a highly endangered species, 
it is not yet extinct’.34  
As a result of the civil liability legislation, the utility of the defence has been strengthened by 
introducing a presumption that the plaintiff is aware of obvious risks. The Ipp Report 
indicated that the intention was ‘to encourage greater use by the courts of the defence of 
assumption of risk.’35 As a result of the recommendations, most civil liability legislation, 
excluding the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, provides for a 
presumption that the plaintiff was actually aware of the risk if it was an obvious one.36 The 
plaintiff has to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she was not aware of an 
obvious risk. This reverses the onus of proof and makes volenti easier to use in the following 
way:  
The effect of these provisions is that a plaintiff is rebuttably presumed to be 
aware of a risk where the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person 
in the position of the plaintiff. A plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption by 
claiming that even though he or she was aware of the general risk of harm, he or 
she was not aware of all its possible manifestations, including the one that 
eventuated.37 
In terms of the wording of the sections relating to obvious risk, there are some variations. 
Tasmania is the only jurisdiction where medical practitioners are under no duty to warn of 
obvious risk.38 Other jurisdictions have provisions that make an exception where the 
defendant is a professional who has been asked for advice.39 But the sections exclude 
professional services that carry the risk of injury or death.40 Queensland and Tasmania have a 
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specific provision relating to the duty of a doctor to warn of risk.41 The section sets out the 
common law duty to warn which includes the proactive duty and the reactive duty.42 
In many jurisdictions, there is no liability for the materialisation of an inherent risk.43 For 
example, there would be no liability for the inherent risks involved in a medical procedure. 
An inherent risk is a risk of something occurring that cannot be avoided by the exercise of 
reasonable care and skill. But this does not affect the duty to warn of the risks.44 
The reversal of the onus of proof through the obvious risk sections has attempted to extend 
the scope of the defence of voluntary assumption of risk.  The plaintiff has to prove that they 
were unaware of the risk. However in relation to health professionals, this defence of volenti 
does not really apply because consent to medical treatment does not amount to assumption of 
the risk so it is difficult to imagine when this defence would apply in a medical negligence 
case. 
 
The peer acceptance defence 
After Rogers v Whitaker45 where the High Court held that professional practice and opinion 
was not conclusive in determining the content of the duty of care but was the responsibility of 
the court to decide, health professionals were concerned about an increase in their liability in 
negligence. The peer acceptance defence has been introduced and enacted by legislation in 
response to a recommendation in the Ipp Report.46 The Ipp Report recommended that the 
Bolam test47 be re-introduced with modifications with regards to medical treatment. The 
recommendation says ‘A medical practitioner is not negligent if the treatment provided was 
in accordance with an opinion widely held by a significant number of respected practitioners 
in the field, unless the court considers that the opinion was irrational’. It has been held that, 
by consideration of the language in the sections, this is a defence and not an integer of 
breach48 and so must be specifically pleaded by the defendant.49 
 
There are differences in the language used in the peer acceptance defence in the different 
jurisdictions. One difference is in terms of who is covered by the defence. Some jurisdictions 
use the term professionals.50 It has been held to include chiropractic treatment.51 Western 
Australia provides a definition for health professional.52 All jurisdictions use the terms 
‘widely accepted’, ‘peer’ and ‘competent’. Queensland and Victoria also include the terms 
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‘significant number’ and ‘respected’. In terms of what is meant by widely accepted and 
competent there has been comment regarding whether this is a test within a test.53 The 
meaning of ‘widely accepted in Australia’ was considered in Vella v Permanent 
Mortgages Pty Ltd.54 There can be conflicting expert evidence55 and an expert can be 
someone who is materially interested in the proceedings.56 
There are exceptions to the widely accepted defence, depending on the precise wording in the 
legislation in the particular jurisdiction, including where it is irrational,57 unreasonable58 or by 
Wednesbury unreasonableness (so unreasonable that no reasonable health professional in the 
health professional’s position could have acted or omitted to do something in accordance 
with that practice).59 There have been cases which have commented on irrationality60 and the 
meaning of irrationality61 and also comment about what the exceptions mean.62 
The defence must be pleaded, and possibly the section specifically referred to, if a defendant 
wishes to rely on it at trial.63 There have been cases where the peer acceptance defence would 
have been successful but was not necessary because the plaintiff was not able to establish the 
elements of the negligence action.64 For example see Melchior v Sydney Adventist Hospital 
Ltd where the court found that while a duty of care was owed the content of the duty of care 
did not include administering the drug as pleaded by the plaintiff. So there was no breach or 
causation but if there had been a negligence action it would have failed because of the peer 
acceptance defence.65  
It is important to note that the peer acceptance defence only applies to treatment and not 
advice. There are differences in the wording of the different sections which may lead to 
different interpretations by the courts like saying ‘in Australia’ as in Victoria and New South 
Wales. Another difference is the use of the word ‘unreasonable’ in Victoria where the other 
jurisdictions use ‘irrational’.  
However it could be argued, in light of the cases so far decided, that the circumstances where 
the defence would be successful would also be where the elements of the negligence action 
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Good Samaritans 
Good samaritans are people who give assistance to others in an emergency. There is a 
strongly held view among health professionals that they have a chance of being sued if they 
provide assistance in an emergency.66 This concern however has not resulted in cases being 
heard by the courts.67 However, there is protection for good samaritans even though the Ipp 
Report recommended against such protection.68 The Ipp Report declined to recommend a 
specific section limiting the liability of good samaritans.69 However, the civil liability 
legislation in all jurisdictions has addressed the issue of liability of people who assist in an 
emergency.70  
Generally, the protection in the legislation is for someone who offers assistance in a medical 
emergency with no expectation of being paid and the person acts in good faith. In some 
jurisdictions, there is also protection for medical practitioners, or in some jurisdictions like 
Victoria and Tasmania anyone, for advice on how to treat an injured person.71 For example, 
in New South Wales, a person who provides assistance, in good faith and without expectation 
of payment or reward, is protected in an emergency when someone has suffered injuries or 
appears to have suffered injuries.72 Other jurisdictions, such as Queensland, have created 
protection for persons performing duties for entities to enhance public safety, if it is in an 
emergency and the assistance is provided in good faith, but have no specific provision for 
good samaritans like in New South Wales.73 There are also specific protections for health 
professionals giving assistance in an emergency. For example, medical practitioners and 
nurses are protected in Queensland74 as well as ambulance officers in New South Wales and 
Queensland.75 
There is no protection for health professionals from civil liability in certain circumstances. In 
South Australia and Western Australia, recklessness is not protected.76 In Queensland, gross 
negligence is not protected and the services must be performed without expectation of fee or 
reward.77 In all jurisdictions except Victoria, a good samaritan is not protected if significantly 
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72 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 57.   
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75 Health Services Act 1997 (NSW) s 67; Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld) ss 38, 39. 
76 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 74; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1D. 
77 Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 16. 
impaired by alcohol or drugs.78 In New South Wales, there is no protection if the person 
either intentionally or negligently caused the initial injuries.79 In New South Wales and 
Tasmania, there is no protection if the person claims to have training they do not have.80 
Another aspect to the issue of the civil liability of good samaritans is the question whether a 
health professional will be sued if they do not assist someone in an emergency. The answer is 
that there is no duty to rescue in Australia.81 Of course, a doctor is under a professional code 
of practice.82 However one case which causes conflict with this general proposition is Lowns 
v Woods83 where a doctor was held liable even though the plaintiff was not his patient. It 
could be argued that since the case was decided by the Court in the era when the proximity 
test was used, and the courts now use the multi-factorial approach, the case should be seen in 
light of the proximity test and could be distinguished now using the current test for duty of 
care. 
Considering the extent to which the tort law reforms have limited the liability of health 
professionals, in terms of cases going before the courts, there were no significant claims 
before the civil liability legislation in the various jurisdictions were enacted and there remains 
no significant claims being made in negligence with regards health professionals being sued 
for assisting in a medical emergency.84 
 
Apologies 
Apologies can be made with no admission of legal liability to encourage them being made 
and thereby reduce the number of actions being commenced. The Ipp Report did not make 
recommendations about apologies. However apologies are becoming increasingly important 
in medical negligence cases, especially in the area of the disclosure of adverse medical 
events. All jurisdictions in Australia have legislation which encourages apologies or the 
reducing or waiving of fees payable for the service by making such actions not an admission 
of liability.85 There are differences in the legislation in terms of how an apology is defined 
and whether it is deemed not to be an admission of liability, or not admissible as an 
admission of liability.86 The objective of the legislation is to reduce litigation. Many plaintiffs 
want ‘recognition of their injury, an explanation and an apology’.87 The theory is that fewer 
patients sue doctors if the doctors have apologised and if apologies are not an admission of 
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liability then more doctors will make apologies, thus resulting in a reduction of cases being 
commenced.88 
There have been Queensland amendments in September 2010 which extend apology 
protections including implied admission of fault.89 In addition to the existing sections dealing 
with ‘expression of regret’, Queensland now has sections covering an apology. Apology is 
defined as ‘an expression of sympathy or regret, or of a general sense of benevolence or 
compassion, in connection with any matter, whether or not it admits or implies an admission 
of fault in relation to the matter.’90 An apology ‘does not constitute an express or implied 
admission of fault or liability by the person in relation to the matter.’91 
Considering the extent to which the tort law reforms have limited the liability of health 
professionals, before the civil liability legislations were enacted, expressions of regret and 
apologies could be used as evidence of an admission of fault whereas now they are not 
admissible. However just because an apology is made does not necessarily automatically 
mean there will be liability found. The apology just forms part of the evidence used to 
establish the elements of an action.92 Therefore making apologies not an admission of 
liability does not have a significant impact once a matter goes to court. The importance of an 
apology is more at the stage when a party is considering whether or not to start proceedings. 
Therefore for health professionals, the utility of an apology is in the period before 
proceedings are instituted. 
 
Summary of Defences 
In medical negligence cases, there are only a few cases were contributory negligence has 
been successfully used despite the legislating of the same standard of care for both plaintiffs 
and defendants. Voluntary assumption of the risk is still not applicable to medical negligence 
cases despite the legislation of obvious risks and the reversal of the onus of proof. While the 
peer acceptance defence is a new introduction, it would seem that the circumstances where it 
is applicable would also be where it is likely that no breach would be found. Therefore the 
defence would seem to not deny liability where liability would have been found but for the 
defence. With health professionals assisting in a medical emergency, it would be arguable 
that as there were no significant claims being made before the civil liability legislation, the 
tort law reforms have not had much impact by introducing protection in those circumstances. 
Protecting the making of apologies from civil proceedings only assists in the period before 
litigation is commenced. Therefore it can be argued that in medical negligence cases, 
defences are rarely successful. This was the position before the civil liability legislation and 
remains the case after the tort law reforms of the past decade. 
 
Statutory Limits 
When a negligence action has been successfully proved by a plaintiff, the court awards 
compensatory damages. The purpose of compensatory damages is to put the plaintiff back in 
the position they would have been but for the negligence of the defendant. The assessment of 
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damages was governed by common law principles with the court exercising its discretion in 
the determination of the quantum of the damages. As a result of the tort law reform, there are 
now statutory limits placed on the recovery of damages including the use of thresholds and 
caps. The purpose of the statutory limits is to limit the amount and extent of liability and to 
thereby make it less attractive to plaintiffs to commence proceedings. There are also statutory 




One of the largest components of damages awarded is for gratuitous care. The Ipp Report 
recommended that there should be a threshold on this head of damages.93 Many jurisdictions 
have imposed a threshold for the awarding of damages under this head.94 However, once the 
threshold has been reached, an award can be made even if the services afterwards are less 
than the threshold amount.95 The Australian Capital Territory does not have a threshold for 
gratuitous care.96 Tasmania has abolished the right to damages for gratuitous care.97 
 
For claims for personal injuries under the head of non-economic loss, plaintiffs must now 
reach a threshold before an amount will be awarded under this head of damages. Included in 
non-economic loss is pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, loss of enjoyment of life 
and in some jurisdictions disfigurement.98 The Ipp Report recommended the threshold be set 
at 15%99 of a most extreme case and this has been adopted in New South Wales.100 Other 
jurisdictions have adopted different approaches. For example, Victoria requires a ‘significant 
injury’ which in most cases means 5% for personal injury and 10% for mental harm.101 
Queensland does not have a threshold but has a sliding scale.102 South Australia has a sliding 
scale and a threshold of significant impairment.103 Tasmania and Western Australia have an 
indexed threshold.104 Northern Territory has a 5% impairment threshold.105 The Australian 
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Caps 
The Ipp Report recommended a cap of $250 000 on damages for non-economic loss.106 
Queensland adopted this cap but in 2010 made amendments so the cap is now indexed if the 
injury arose from 1 July 2010.107 In the other jurisdictions, except in the Australian Capital 
Territory, there is a cap for non-pecuniary general damages which is either indexed or higher 
or lower than recommended.108 
 
The Ipp Report also recommended that loss of earning capacity be capped to twice the 
average weekly earnings.109 In all jurisdictions, there are caps for the loss of earning capacity 
which restrict the amount that may be awarded. Most jurisdictions have capped the loss of 
earning capacity to three times the average weekly earnings.110 In South Australia, there is a 
prescribed limit.111 
 
The Ipp Report also recommended that all awards for future loss be discounted by 3%.112 
Most jurisdictions have adopted a rate of 5%.113 Tasmania and Western Australia have higher 
rates.114 The Australian Capital Territory has continued with the common law. 
 
Exemplary Damages 
Exemplary damages can be awarded at common law to punish and deter certain behaviour of 
the defendant. This category of damages is usually awarded in circumstances where the 
defendant displayed some conscious wrongdoing where the rights of the plaintiff have been 
disregarded by the defendant. An example in a medical negligence case where exemplary 
damages has been awarded is Shoebridge v Thomas115 where a surgeon left an abdominal roll 
in the patient’s upper abdomen and took steps to conceal the mistake from the patient for two 
months. Exemplary damages of $20 000 were awarded in that case. 
 
In response to a recommendation in the Ipp Report,116 some jurisdictions, New South Wales, 
the Northern Territory and Queensland, have abolished the awarding of exemplary damages 
                                                
106 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002) (‘The Ipp Report’), Recommendation 48. 
107 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 62 and Schedule 6A. 
108 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 16(2); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 27; 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 62; Civil Liability Act 1935 (SA), s 52; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss 27-28; 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28G; Civil Liability Act 2003 (WA), s 10. Section 99 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT) allows reference to prior cases.  
109 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002) (‘The Ipp Report’), Recommendation 49. 
110 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 38; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 12; Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 20; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 54; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas), s 26; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28F; Civil Liability Act 2003 (WA), s 11. 
111 Civil Liability Act 1935 (SA), s 54. 
112 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002) (‘The Ipp Report’), Recommendation 53. 
113 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 14; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 22; Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 57; Civil Liability Act 1935 (SA), s 57; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28I. 
114 Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act 1986 (Tas), s 4; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 
(WA), s 5. 
115 (1999) BCJ No 1747 (SC). 
116 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002) (‘The Ipp Report’), Recommendations 60. 
with some exceptions.117 This has therefore limited the liability of health professionals in 
those jurisdictions. 
 
Limitation of Actions 
Another statutory limit is the limitation of actions. Limitation periods in some jurisdictions 
have been amended in accordance with the recommendations of the Ipp Report.118 Some 
jurisdictions have ’date of discoverability’ as the start of time running, so it does not matter if 
health professional did not disclose the adverse event. Otherwise, evidence of concealment 
can be useful where there is discretion for extending the limitation period. 
A number of problems can arise in medical negligence cases with regards to limitation of 
actions, including, that plaintiffs do not realise their injury has been caused by the health 
professional or the health provider, there may be a delay in realising there is an injury, or they 
may not realise they have a potential action.119 Time will not begin to run until at least all the 
elements of the action are complete which means for negligence actions that damage must 
have been suffered after a breach of the duty of care.  
The important issue is to determine when the limitation period has begun to run. In the 
Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, Queensland and South Australia, the 
time starts to run from the date the action accrues.120 In New South Wales, Tasmania, 
Victoria and Western Australia the period begins at the date of discoverability,121 which was 
the position recommended by the Ipp Report.122 New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria 
also provide that an action will be statute barred if no injury attributable to the defendant has 
occurred within 12 years of the incident.123  
There are provisions for applying for extensions of time. The Australian Capital Territory, 
Tasmania and Victoria will allow an extension if it is found to be ‘just and reasonable’.124 In 
New South Wales, for actions accrued on or after 6 December 2002, the plaintiff may apply 
for an extension if it is ‘just and reasonable’ and the extension must not extend ‘beyond the 
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period of three years after the date on which the cause of action is discoverable’.125 For an 
extension to be granted in the Northern Territory and South Australia, the court must be 
satisfied that it would be just in all the circumstances.126 In Western Australia, the court must 
be satisfied that the plaintiff did not know of certain factors before the limitation period 
expired.127 In Queensland, the court may extend the limitation period for one year after a 
material fact of a decisive character has come to the attention of the plaintiff which provides 
evidence to establish the cause of action.128 An extension may be denied if there is prejudice 
to the possible defendant129 and a court will only grant the extension where ‘justice is best 
served’.130  
There have been some recent cases on the issue of limitation of actions. In the Queensland 
case of Newman v State of Queensland, a plaintiff was granted an extension in his action 
against a hospital.131 The plaintiff had been treated at a hospital in Moree and then in 
Brisbane. It was only after receiving a report from an expert that the plaintiff realised that the 
second hospital might also be liable in negligence.132 The limitation period was extended for 
a year after the receiving of the report.133 In the Victorian decision of Delai v Western 
District Health Services, the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the terms ‘fault’, 
‘discoverable’ and ‘just and reasonable’ for the purposes of deciding whether an extension of 
time should be granted. In arguing against the granting of an extension of time, the defendant 
needs to identify specific difficulty experienced and not just point to the general concept.134 
An important part of the decision concerned the extension of time, with the Court stating: 
‘The delay in this case has not prejudiced a fair trial…plaintiff has not acted unreasonably…it 
is just and reasonable to extend the limitation period.’135 
 
Limitation periods are an important statutory limit, particularly in medical negligence cases, 
because in some medical circumstances the discovery of the acts or omissions of the health 
professionals by the patient can be delayed or the damage suffered can be delayed in 
becoming known to the patient. Some jurisdictions have used the tort law reform to reduce 
the limitation periods. 
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Mental Harm 
Prior to Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd136 normal fortitude, 
sudden shock and direct perception were requirements to a finding of a duty of care in cases 
involving pure psychiatric injury. After those cases the factors of normal fortitude, sudden 
shock and direct perception were relevant to reasonable foreseeability but were no longer 
arbitrary rules of exclusion. The Ipp Report recommended that the requirement of normal 
fortitude be re-introduced by providing that there is no liability for pure mental harm unless it 
is reasonably foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude would suffer a recognised 
psychiatric injury in the circumstances.137 The recommendation then lists the matters to take 
into account in determining reasonable foreseeabilty in the circumstances, including direct 
perception, sudden shock and the relationships between the parties. In some jurisdictions, 
provisions relating to mental harm have been introduced re-instating the requirement of 
normal fortitude and direct perception.138  
 
At common law the plaintiff must have suffered a recognisable psychiatric illness. However 
some states have introduced legislation which refers to a recognised psychiatric injury139 
which would seem to limit it to the psychiatric illnesses at the time of enactment. Where the 
plaintiff witnesses someone else being injured and suffers a recognisable psychiatric illness, 
some states have introduced legislation which makes it necessary for the plaintiff to either be 
in a close relationship with the victim or be present at the scene at the time of the injury.140 
This would seem to mean that emergency workers like police and health professionals would 
not be able to be successful in a negligence action for pure psychiatric injury unless they were 
present when the accident happened. This was the argument in Wicks v State Rail Authority of 
New South Wales; Sheehan v State Rail Authority of New South Wales141 where police who 
attended the aftermath of a train accident were originally denied the right of recovery. 
However the High Court held that the appeal should be allowed and the matter be returned to 
the Court of Appeal to decide whether there was a duty of care owed and whether the 
appellants suffered recognised psychiatric injuries of which the negligence of the respondent 
was a cause. The Court held that the survivors were in peril until they were rescued from the 
derailment and taken to a place of safety.142 Therefore this occurred over an extended period 
of time. The Court also rejected the respondent’s argument that the section required that the 
psychiatric injury be caused by the observation of what was happening to a particular 
victim.143 Therefore, the Court interpreted the legislation in compliance with the common 
law. 
 
Therefore the civil liability legislation in the jurisdictions where this statutory limit with 
regards mental harm has been introduced, has limited the liability of health professionals by 
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requiring normal fortitude. However with regards direct perception where the health 
professional is the rescuer and has suffered mental harm, the court will interpret the 
legislation in compliance with the common law. 
 
Summary of Statutory Limits 
The introduction of thresholds for gratuitous care and non-economic loss has limited the 
liability of health professionals. Caps on damages for non-economic loss and loss of earning 
capacity have also limited the liability of health professionals as has the discounting of all 
awards for future economic loss. In some jurisdictions, exemplary damages have been 
abolished and time limitations reduced. The re-introduction of normal fortitude as a 
requirement for recovery for mental harm has limited the liability of health professionals. 





From considering the various defences and statutory limits, a pattern can be seen to emerge: 
legislation has been passed with the purpose of limiting liability but the courts interpret it and 
the result is the same as under the common law. This result is understandable considering the 
objectives of the Ipp Report were to re-state the law of negligence but also to limit liability. It 
could be argued that by 2001 the High Court was already moving towards ‘a greater 
orientation towards the defendant’.144 With the decision of Sullivan v Moody145 the High 
Court was already beginning to interpret the law of negligence in a more restrictive manner 
by rejecting the proximity test and instead moved to a multi-factorial approach which 
considered the relevant factors in the circumstances of the case which included control and 
vulnerability, coherency of the law and policy arguments. Therefore it could be argued that 
the defences have not really changed. However what has changed since 2001 are the statutory 
limits on the amount of compensation. 
 
So while it is right to say that the civil liability reforms have impacted on the liability of 
health professionals, it is not because of the successful use of defences but rather the use of 
statutory limits like thresholds and caps which limit the assessment of damages which has 
had the impact of reducing the quantum of damages awarded by the courts. 
 
There have been some changes to medical negligence, but generally courts have interpreted 
the tort law reforms in compliance with common law where there is any ambiguity. In 
relation to defences, while on the surface the legislation appears to place limits on the liability 
of health professionals, in practice it appears to have not made much difference to the 
outcome of whether there is a negligence action. The greatest impact has been on the 
quantum of damages. Therefore the result is that health professionals are held liable for 
negligence but the damages are reduced because of statutory limits like thresholds, caps and 
presumptions. 
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